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Abstract
A fundamental property of a progressive income tax is that it provides implicit insurance
against shocks to income by dampening the variability of disposable income and consumption.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) in combination with the Tax Reform Act of
1986 (TRA86) greatly reduced the number of marginal tax brackets and the maximum marginal
rate, which limits the stabilizing effect of the tax system on household consumption when pre-tax
income fluctuates. We examine the effect of the federal income tax reforms of the 1980s on the
associated degree of automatic stabilization of consumption. The empirical framework derives
from the consumption insurance literature, where the ideal outcome is spatially equal changes in
households’ marginal utilities of consumption, and permits partial insurance, which we use to
identify how the degree of consumption insurance has changed since ERTA and TRA86.

Our

data come from interview years 1980–1991 in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We find
that in certain cases the tax reforms of the 1980s actually increased the automatic stabilization
inherent in the United States income tax. Overall, ERTA and TRA86 reduced consumption
stability by about 50 percent. More recent tax reforms, most notably increased EITC generosity,
have restored or enhanced consumption insurance. A welfare analysis indicates that the cost of
moving to the post-TRA86 system is sizable for relatively risk averse households facing large
income risk, but is much more modest for the typical household.

Introduction
One of the most important economic events of the 1980s was the comprehensive
overhaul of the United States federal income tax system. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 (ERTA) reduced marginal tax rates an average of 23 percent within each bracket. The Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) broadened the tax base and reduced the number of tax brackets
from 16 to four. The marginal tax rate on highest income earners dropped from 70 percent in
1981 to 50 percent in 1982 and dropped further to 28 percent in 1988. In 1980 over 75 percent of
taxpayers faced statutory tax rates above 15 percent; by 1995 fewer than 25 percent faced rates
above 15 percent (Burman et al. 1998). Overall, the tax reforms in the 1980s reduced the average
tax burden by 25 percent. Many economists have examined how tax reform influenced incentives
to work (Blundell et al. 1998; Bosworth and Burtless 1992; Eissa 1996;, Kniesner and Ziliak
1998; Ziliak and Kniesner 1999), to save (Bernheim 1999; Bosworth and Burtless 1992; Engen
and Gale 1996), and to invest (Auerbach 1996; Auerbach and Slemrod 1997). Conspicuously
absent is research on how the tax reforms of the 1980s offset a beneficial dimension of
progressive taxation, automatic stabilization of expenditures. We examine empirically how the
reforms to the federal income tax in the United States during the 1980s reduced the automatic
smoothing of household consumption after a shock to income.
The paucity of empirical research on automatic stabilization is somewhat surprising
because of the parallel literature on the consumption smoothing benefits of social insurance
programs (Hamermesh 1982; Gruber 1996, 1997; Dynarski and Gruber 1997) and because a key
aspect of a progressive income tax is providing collective insurance against idiosyncratic shocks
to income in turn smoothing consumption and dampening the business cycle. For example,
consumption falls by less than a negative shock to taxable income because the household’s tax

burden is reduced, possibly because it falls into a lower marginal tax bracket. ERTA and TRA86
lowered tax rates and established fewer and wider marginal tax brackets, which diminishes the
likelihood of falling into a lower tax bracket after a negative shock to income and limits
households’ ability to maintain consumption compared to a more progressive tax. Contrary to the
welfare-enhancing effects of the flattening of the income tax during the 1980s operating through
the labor-supply substitution effect (Hausman 1981; Kniesner and Ziliak 1998), a weakened
automatic

stabilizer

is

welfare-reducing because households have greater variability of

disposable incomes (Varian 1980).
There is substantial empirical research on how actions within families (Hayashi, Altonji,
and Kotlikoff 1996) and between families (Altug and Miller 1990; Attanasio and Davis 1996;
Banks et al. 1997; Cochrane 1991; Deaton 1997; Gertler and Gruber 1997; Ham and Jacobs
2000; Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff 1996; Mace 1991; Nelson 1994; and Townsend 1994) can
stabilize consumption. Recent research on implicit consumption insurance uses a theoretical
framework in which a hypothetical central planner allocates resources across households to
equate the growth rates of the marginal utilities of consumption. The strong testable implication
of complete consumption insurance is that after accounting for changes in aggregate resources
the growth of an individual household’s consumption should not depend on changes in the
household’s own economic resources. With few exceptions (Altug and Miller 1990; Mace 1991),
empirical research rejects complete implicit consumption insurance.
An income tax produces partial implicit consumption insurance for households when
income changes, whether the change is anticipated or unanticipated. There is little research on
partial implicit consumption insurance; most of it focuses on developing countries (Deaton 1997;
Gertler and Gruber 1997), and little of it considers recent United States tax reforms (Auerbach
and Feenberg 2000; Cohen and Follette 1999).
2

We specify a model of the evolution of consumption where the focus is on identifying the
degree to which partial consumption insurance has changed because of ERTA and TRA86. To
track time variation in partial risk sharing we use panel data and the Keane and Runkle (1992)
forward-filter estimators of Euler equations with latent heterogeneity. Our data are from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for interview years 1980–1991, which encompasses the
periods before ERTA and after TRA86. Food consumption is the measure examined most often
by researchers using the PSID to test complete consumption insurance (Altug and Miller 1990;
Cochrane 1991; Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff 1996; and Ham and Jacobs 2000). Because the
Food Stamp Program will stabilize food consumption it is plausible that the tax reforms of the
1980s did little to food consumption. We therefore focus primarily on total consumption
constructed as a residual of income net of taxes and saving (Ziliak 1998).
We find that across the 1980s the progressive income tax stabilized household
consumption by 15 percent in response to a given reduction in gross income. On balance, though,
the tax reforms of the 1980s cut in half the consumption stabilizing effect of the United States
income tax. Welfare simulations indicate that the average household would have to be
compensated annually with an additional 2.5 percent of baseline consumption to move from a
pre-ERTA tax system to an equal-yield annual lump-sum tax, compared to compensation of 1.4
percent to move from a post-TRA86 system to an equal-yield annual lump-sum tax. Moreover,
the cost of moving to the post-TRA86 system is upwards of 6 percent for relatively risk averse
households facing large income risk, but is much more modest for the typical household. Our
results highlight an under-appreciated benefit of a progressive tax system and how that benefit
was reduced by the 1980s tax reforms. There are some exceptions. Changes in Social Security
taxes and the Earned Income Tax Credit during the 1980s and 1990s increasingly stabilized
consumption for low-income couples and single mothers in the upper half of the income
distribution.
3

Conceptual Framework
The theory of complete consumption insurance begins with a social planner who, given
household-specific social weights, µh , allocates resources under uncertainty across households
and over time to equalize the growth rates of the marginal utilities of consumption.
Algebraically, the planner’s problem is to maximize the weighted sum of households’ utilities
H

Max ∑ µ
h =1

T

h

S

∑∑ (ρ

) πstU (cst , δ st ),

h t

h

h

(1)

t =1 s =1

where h indexes households, t indexes time, s indexes economic state, ρh is the household’s rate
of time preference, π st is the probability of state s in time t, csth is the household’s consumption in
state s and time t, and δ hst indexes shocks to preferences across households and over time. The
adding up constraint in the maximization problem posed is
H

∑c

h
st

= Cst ,

(2)

h =1

such that the sum of households’ consumption expenditures is aggregate consumption in state s
at time t.
The choice variable is household consumption, csth , and the first-order conditions for
maximizing (1) subject to (2) given the realization of state s are
(ρ h ) t µ h πtU c (cth ,δth ) = λt ,

(3)

where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resources constraint, and Uc is the
marginal utility of consumption.
Taking the natural log of (3), first differencing to eliminate the fixed household social
weight µh , and rearranging yields the Euler equation
∆ ln U c (cth ,δht ) = ∆ ln λ t − ∆ ln πt − ln ρh .

(4)

4

Equation (4) describes the main implication of complete consumption insurance. The discounted
growth in the marginal utility of consumption is constant across households; given aggregate
resources, changes in an individual household’s resources do not affect how its marginal utility
of consumption evolves.
To operationalize (4) we need to specify a functional form for within-period utility. We
use the isoelastic utility function suggested by Deaton (1997)
U (cth ,δht ) ≡ U (cth , θ ht , σ ) = (1 − σ ) −1 θth nth ( cth / nth )(1−σ ) ,

(5)

where θ ht is a multiplicative taste shifter capturing time variation in the household’s preferences,
σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, nth is the size of household h at time t, and cth / nth is
per capita consumption. 1

Given isoelastic preferences and defining ∆ ln λ*t ≡ ∆ ln λt − ∆ ln πt ,

equation (4) becomes
∆ ln(cth / nth ) = − σ −1 (∆ ln λ*t − ∆ ln θ th − ln ρ h ) = − σ −1 (∆ ln λ*t −∆ε ht ) .

(6)

With preference shocks that are mean zero stochastic disturbances the discounted growth of per
capita consumption will be the same for all households.
Equation (6) is the mode specification in the empirical literature on consumption
insurance. The substantial amount of research emerging over the past decade tests the complete
insurance hypothesis with data from both developing countries (Deaton 1997; Gertler and Gruber
1997; Morduch 1995; Townsend 1994) and developed countries (Altug and Miller 1990;
Attanasio and Davis 1996; Banks et al. 1997; Cochrane 1991; Hayashi et al. 1996; Mace 1991;
Nelson 1994). The predominant finding is that complete implicit consumption insurance is not
typical either between or within families.
Rejection of complete insurance is probably not surprising given the moral hazard
problems inherent in devising comprehensive intra- and inter-household insurance schemes. At
the same token, the weakness of high-frequency co-movements in the relative wage and
5

consumption distributions strongly rejects the extreme alternative of no consumption smoothing
(Attanasio and Davis 1996). Both public and private institutions clearly exist that offset
consumption loss because of income loss. A more general approach to examining consumption
insurance empirically admits partial consumption insurance, whose effectiveness may vary over
time.
How the Income Tax Creates Partial Consumption Insurance
Consider the United States federal income tax system and the attendant reforms in the
1980s. If the only tradeoff facing policymakers were between the equity effects of changing the
income distribution and the efficiency effects of behavioral incentives, then the optimal income
tax literature yields either a declining or zero marginal income tax on the highest income earner
(Stiglitz 1987; Dahan and Strawczynski 2000) or in some cases a U-shaped marginal tax rate
structure (Diamond 1998). However, if policymakers are also concerned about the variability of
after-tax income and consumption, and some of the observed differences in income are due to
exogenous differences in “luck,” then the marginal tax rate on the highest income earner might
be quite large (Varian 1980; Strawczynski 1998). If redistribution and partial insurance are
important policy objectives then a steeply progressive income tax system might on balance be
welfare improving.
In Table 1 we present the United States federal income tax rates for a married couple
filing jointly for the years immediately before and after ERTA (1980 and 1982) and the years
immediately before and after TRA86 (1985 and 1987). The pre-ERTA United States federal
income tax system is targeted towards redistribution and partial insurance. In 1980 there were 16
marginal tax rates, which increased by about 4 percentage points for each successive bracket
above the zero bracket amount. At low levels of the taxable income distribution the tax brackets
were quite narrow, creating a high probability of a tax-rate reduction in the event of an
idiosyncratic income loss. As evidenced by the rate schedules for 1982 and 1985, ERTA did
6

little to the number and width of tax brackets. However, ERTA indexed the brackets for inflation
by 1985 and reduced the marginal tax rates at all levels, especially for upper-income Americans.
TRA86 slashed the number of statutory brackets to five in 1987 and to four in 1988 (the 33
percent rate created a so-called bubble for some higher-income taxpayers before declining back
to 28 percent). Under TRA86 the brackets were widened substantially, which reduces the
probability of a marginal tax-rate reduction in the presence of income loss, although average tax
burdens still decline within brackets. Changes to the United States federal income tax code in the
1980s suggest a reduced concern about the automatic stabilizing component of the system
relative to the deadweight loss of reduced incentives. Indeed, the 1982 and 1987 issues of the
Economic Report of the President contain extensive discussion of the efficiency costs of high
income tax rates but no mention of the possible efficiency benefits via consumption smoothing. 2
An intuitive way to think about the partial-insurance capability of the federal income tax
is through the curvature of the tax function. In Figure 1 we graph the statutory rates for 1980 and
1987. It appears that the pre-ERTA system is more globally concave than the post-TRA86 rate
structure; the rate of change in marginal tax rates is greater overall before ERTA than after
TRA86. However, the 1987 structure appears more locally concave in certain regions,
particularly in the 15 to 28 percent marginal tax brackets. If the bulk of taxpayers are located just
above the 28 percent tax kink, then it is possible that automatic stabilization actually increased
with TRA86. In 1995 about 60 percent of taxpayers were in the 15 percent bracket, and about 17
percent were in the 28 percent bracket (Burman et al. 1998). Provided that the incomes of upperincome Americans are relatively rigid downward, the likely outcome was a decrease in automatic
stabilization with TRA86.
Concurrent with reforms to the federal income tax were reforms to the Social Security
payroll tax (FICA) in the early 1980s and to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) with TRA86.
Because of concerns over the solvency of the Social Security program, Congress legislated an
7

aggressive program to increase both the FICA tax base and tax rates. During 1980–1987 the
FICA tax base increased by 70 percent from $25,900 to $43,800, and the payroll tax rate
increased by 17 percent from 6.13 to 7.15 percent. To counter the regressivity of the payroll tax
and to stimulate work among low-income households Congress also expanded the EITC in 1986.
The phase-in subsidy rate of the EITC increased from 10 percent in 1980 to 14 percent in 1987
and the phase-out rate decreased from 12.5 percent to 10 percent. The declining phase-out tax
rate resulted in a 54 percent increase in the cut-off income level for credit eligibility from
$10,000 to $15,432. Overall, reforms to Social Security and the EITC offset to some extent the
declines in federal marginal tax rates for low and moderate-income earners and likely restored
the implicit automatic stabilization in the tax system.
Econometric Framework Admitting Partial Insurance
To estimate how the partial consumption insurance implicit in the United States income
tax system evolved during the 1980s we amend the Euler equation for household consumption
(6) to become
∆ ln(cth / nth ) = α∆ ln(C t ) +β∆ ln(y dth ) +∆ε th ,

(7)

where aggregate consumption, Ct, represents aggregate resource constraints at time t, and ydth is
ydth ≡ yth − Τ( yth − E th − Dth ) + Cth ( yth ) . Total tax

the household’s time t disposable income,

payments, T(·), are a function of taxable income defined as gross income less exemptions and
deductions, and tax credits, C(·), are a function of gross income. With complete consumption
insurance, any variable cross-sectionally uncorrelated with preference shocks should be zero
given controls for aggregate resources, or that β = 0 . Under partial insurance, changes in
consumption will be a function of both aggregate and idiosyncratic resources (β ≠ 0) . With
partial insurance the elasticity of per capita consumption with respect to gross income is

8

h
∂ ln(cth / nth ) h
h yt
y
=
β
(1
−
τ
)
,
t
t
∂yth
ydth

where τth is the household’s combined marginal tax rate from total tax payments T(·) and credits

C (·).3 Stabilization emanates both through the marginal tax rate, τ th , and implicitly through
average tax rates via changes in disposable income, ydth .

Data
Our data come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for interview years
1980–1991. The survey has followed a core set of households since 1968 plus newly formed
households as members of the original core have split off into new families. The PSID contains
detailed information on income and household composition. Our sample spans the two major
recent income tax reforms in the United States, which occurred in 1981 (ERTA) and 1986
(TRA86), and our data are the best available to study how a less graduated income tax affected
the automatic stabilization of consumption inherent in the United States progressive income tax.4
Our sample is an unbalanced panel treating missing observations as exogenous events.
By eliminating only a missing person year of data the time series for each household can be of
different length within 1980–1991. To be included in the sample the household head must (1) be
at least 25 in 1980 and no more than 64 in 1991, (2) be finished with schooling by 1980, (3) not
be permanently disabled or institutionalized, and (4) have the same marital status for 1980–1991
(so as to keep the same tax table, which facilitates understanding how taxpayers who income
split with a spouse for tax purposes may be differentially affected by the tax reforms of the
1980s). To reduce further the influence of household composition changes and possible outliers
we follow the existing literature and delete person-years with more than a 300 percent increase
or more than a 75 percent decrease in consumption. We also require per capita consumption and
9

disposable income to be no less than $1,000 in any year. Our selection criteria produce a sample
of 1,298 households with 12,341 person years of consumption.
Consumption
The advantage of the PSID relative to repeated cross-section surveys such as the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) is that the PSID follows the same households
longitudinally, which makes it unnecessary to construct a time series on artificial households
based on membership in demographic cohorts (Attanasio and Davis 1996). The disadvantage of
the PSID is that it presents less ideal measures of consumption than the CEX. Previous studies
using the PSID to test for complete consumption insurance examine Euler equations for food
consumption expenditures (Altug and Miller 1990; Cochrane 1991; Hayashi, Altonji, and
Kotlikoff 1996). For comparability we too estimate Euler equations for food expenditures.
Because tests of the permanent income hypothesis are known to be sensitive to the consumption
measure, we focus on a broader measure of consumption defined as the residual of income net of
the change in predicted wealth and taxes paid (Ziliak 1998).
To elaborate on the more comprehensive consumption measure we use, the PSID allows
one to estimate household wealth ( Aˆth ) , and, given wealth, construct personal saving as the year-

ˆ h − Aˆ h . Total consumption then follows by subtracting saving
to-year change in wealth, Sˆth = A
t+1
t
from disposable personal income, cˆth = y dth − Sˆth . The precision of total consumption as disposable
income net of changes in wealth accumulation rests on how well we predict wealth ( Aˆth ) .
Using the PSID one can construct wealth alternatively as liquid assets (the capitalized
value of rent, interest, and dividend income) or the sum of liquid assets and home equity (the
difference between house value and mortgage principal). However, liquid assets and home equity
miss changes in wealth holdings in the 1980s via Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). An
alternative is to exploit information in the PSID wealth supplements.
10

In 1984 and 1989 the PSID conducted detailed wealth surveys for each household head,
including questions on the amount of cash in checking and savings accounts, stock and bond
holdings, vehicle equity, farm and non-farm business equity, equity in primary and secondary
homes/real estate, and IRA contributions. Our strategy for predicting wealth is to estimate fixedeffect wealth regressions as a function of liquid assets or liquid assets and home equity.
Specifically, we pool the 1984 and 1989 wealth supplements for the 1298 household heads and
permit a household-specific intercept along with a common coefficient each for liquid assets and
home equity.
Appendix Table A.1 displays the wealth regressions (with the person-specific intercepts
suppressed). We examine both net worth and net non-housing non-business wealth as dependent
variables. The accuracy of the wealth predictions as determined by the adjusted R2 improves
markedly with net worth relative to the narrower wealth measure, but there is only a trivial
increase in fit from 0.92 to 0.93 when including home equity as an additional covariate in the net
worth prediction equations.
Although Ziliak (1998) focuses on the broader wealth measure, most of the flow in
saving emanates from liquid sources. It may also be tenuous to define consumption as involving
unrealized capital gains in the housing stock.5 Lastly, due to the greater noise in home equity,
when constructing consumption using net worth predicted from liquid assets and home equity
there are an additional 2,000 person-years of data lost relative to net worth predicted from liquid
assets alone. Hence, most of our tests rely on the narrower definition of consumption based on
net worth predicted from liquid assets.6
Our total consumption measure is advantageous compared to food expenditures because
food is stabilized by the Food Stamp Program. The PSID also did not collect food consumption
for the 1988 and 1989 interview years, which are two critical years after TRA86 needed to
identify automatic stabilization effects. Our total consumption measure also improves on
11

predicted consumption for the PSID proposed by Skinner (1987) because the PSID stopped
collecting many of the components used in Skinner’s measure prior to TRA86, and Skinner’s
measure may be more susceptible to changes in the relative prices of goods compared to our
measure (Attanasio and Weber 1995).
A potential disadvantage of our consumption measure is that it implicitly includes
durable goods, which introduces the difficulty of distinguishing between expenditures and
service flows of consumption (Hayashi 1985). Hayashi includes durable consumption by
modeling total consumption as a distributed lag of current and previous expenditures. Although
we do not take the distributed lag approach for the evolution of consumption, we attempt to
control for implied autocorrelation in our total consumption measure via our econometric
estimator as described below. We also have reason to be concerned about potential measurement
error in total consumption, which will lead us to adopt an instrumental variables estimator.
Income and Taxes
The final data issue we need note concerns key independent variables in our estimating
equation (7): gross family income and tax payments. Information is available to construct family
income from labor and interest earnings and transfers received. Because transfer income such as
unemployment insurance, food stamps, and AFDC is an important source of consumption
insurance (Hamermesh 1982; Dynarski and Gruber 1997; Gruber 1996, 1997) we include
government transfers as part of income when identifying the automatic stabilization properties of
income taxes.
With each wave until 1992 the PSID has used household income and estimates of
deductions and exemptions to construct a household’s marginal tax rate and taxes paid. For
exemptions, the PSID has recorded the number of dependents used for tax purposes. For
deductions, they have used the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income to generate a
typical value of itemized deductions for the household’s adjusted gross income. Taxable income
12

is then computed by subtracting positive values of excess itemized deductions (itemized
deductions less the standard deduction) from gross income for tax years prior to 1987, or by
subtracting the larger of itemized deductions and the standard deduction from gross income for
tax years 1987 and beyond. Given taxable income, they then compute tax payments based on the
statutory rates for each year. The PSID also computes an estimated value of the EITC for
qualifying families so that tax payments can be negative. However, they omit both Social
Security tax payments as well as state income tax payments. As in Ziliak and Kniesner (1999)
we obtain an estimate of total taxes by adding to federal income taxes the estimated payroll tax
payment for the head (and spouse when present) and the state income tax payment using the
average income tax rate for the household’s state.7
A possible concern is the quality of the tax data available in the PSID relative to the
population tax-return information collected by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Although a
comprehensive comparison of the PSID tax data with the IRS tax data is beyond our scope, we
can compare the IRS’s published 1980 average tax rates (Statistical Abstract of the United
States, 1983) to average tax rates for 1980 from the PSID. Because the IRS data are from
households of all types, we select a fresh cross-section sample of heads of households in the
1980 PSID to make the PSID data maximally comparable to the IRS data. We report the average
tax rates for adjusted gross income classes in Figure 2. The PSID tax data compare favorably to
the IRS data at all income levels, with the possible exception of the very rich.

Estimation Issues
The complete implicit consumption insurance model in (6) can be estimated consistently
using OLS (Cochrane 1991; Deaton 1997; Gertler and Gruber 1997; Mace 1991; Nelson 1994).
Introducing household-specific disposable income to capture partial insurance makes estimating
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the Euler equation in (7) more complicated econometrically. It is unreasonable to assume that
E (∆ydth ∆εht ) = 0 because the composite error term contains the household-specific discount

factor, lnρh , which is likely to covary with income over the life cycle. Another complexity we
must confront in the econometric setup is that if disposable income is measured with error then it
will covary contemporaneously with the error term in consumption.
Latent Heterogeneity
Consider first the case where the evolution of gross income is not independent of the
discount factor. Because the model in equation (7) is in first differences unobserved personspecific time-invariant heterogeneity in consumption levels is swept away. Growth-rate
heterogeneity may manifest itself in the household’s discount factor. One econometric approach
that immediately comes to mind is to treat the discount factor as fixed and sweep it out with
either the within or the first-difference transformation. Eliminating discount rate heterogeneity
with the first-difference transformation exacerbates measurement errors-in-variables problems
relative to the within transformation and results in the loss of another year of data (Griliches and
Hausman 1986). Here the within transformation also makes predetermined variables invalid as
instruments (Keane and Runkle 1992). Neither the simple first difference or within estimators are
suitable for our purposes.
The econometric approach we take builds on the correlated random-effects estimators of
Mundlak (1978), who proposed using the individual’s means of the time-varying regressors as
proxies for the fixed effect, and Chamberlain (1984), who proposed using the linear projection of
the time-varying regressors as proxies for the fixed effect. We use a correlated random-effects
approach similar to Mundlak (1978), but instead of using the individual’s means of the timevarying regressors we follow more closely the method of Lawrence (1991), who estimates
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discount rates as a function of pre-sample information. The equation for the discount factor we
use is
ln ρh = x hϕ + ωh ,

(8)

where x h is a vector of pre-sample variables and ωh is a mean-zero random error. Pre-sample
information includes the household head’s education level, race, and five-year birth cohort, the
latter of which are intended to capture cohort-specific differences in discount rates. Amended in
light of (8), along with the parameterization of intertemporal preferences described in footnote 1,
our estimating equation becomes
∆ ln(cth / nth ) = α∆ ln(C t ) +β∆ ln( ydth ) + ∆dth γ + x hϕ + ∆ ζ th ,

(9)

where ∆ζ ht = ωh + ∆ ln ν th .
Measurement Error
Estimation of equation (9) is further complicated by possible measurement error in
changes in disposable income. In the case of income changes there are two, possibly offsetting,
sources of measurement error. First, there is classical attenuation bias in the coefficient toward
zero due to incorrect measurement of the various income components and tax payments. Second,
there may be a positive bias arising because the household’s income is used to construct the
dependent variable, total consumption. It is impossible to determine a priori whether stochastic
components of income make the regression coefficient of disposable income likely to be biased
upward or downward, if at all.
To estimate the parameters of equation (9) consistently we specify a vector of moment
conditions, E ( zth∆ζ sh ) = 0∀ s ≥ t , which use an available set of predetermined instruments, z th ,
that are maintained to be orthogonal to the contemporaneous error term. 8 One possible approach
to estimating the moment conditions is two stage least squares (2SLS). Because the error term
∆ζ ht contains both random time-invariant heterogeneity, ωh , and an MA(1) component, ∆ ln ν ht ,
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serial correlation is likely problematic. As discussed previously, total consumption implicitly
contains durable goods, which may also generate autocorrelation. Consequently, 2SLS will not
be efficient. A tractable approach admitting general forms of serial correlation, due both to
unobserved heterogeneity and to the moving average process in ∆ζ ht , is Keane and Runkle’s
(1992) forward-filter estimator.
The forward filter estimator, which still maintains orthogonality with the original set of
predetermined ni struments, has several steps. First, we estimate equation (9) by 2SLS and save
the (T−2) vector of estimated residuals for each household, ∆ζˆ h . We then compute a (T−2) ×
(T−2)

matrix,

1
Cˆ = (
H

∑ ∆ζˆ ∆ζˆ
h

′

h

) −1 ,

and

filter

it

with an

upper-triangular Cholesky

decomposition. Last, we pre-multiply (9) by Qˆ = ( I H ⊗ Cˆ ) and estimate the transformed forwardfiltered equation with the original set of instruments. Although Hansen’s (1982) Generalized
Method-of-Moments (GMM) estimator is efficient, recent bootstrap Monte Carlo evidence is that
the estimator we use has good finite-sample properties relative to 2SLS and GMM (Ziliak 1997).

Empirical Results
We begin estimating (9) by specifying a base-case model where total household
consumption is disposable income net of the change in net worth predicted by liquid assets. As
time-varying demographics we include changes in the number of children in the household and
changes in the age of the youngest child. Controlling for children implicitly introduces household
economies to scale given that consumption is measured in per capita terms. In addition to a
constant and the time-varying covariates the instrument set has values at time (t−1) of the head’s
annual hours of work, age, number of children, real hourly wage, the state unemployment rate,
and dummies for marital status, health status, spouse’s education, geographic region, industry,
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occupation, union status, home ownership, and female headship and values at time (t−2) of real
disposable income. As specification checks on instrument sets we test the validity of the
overidentifying restrictions with the Sargan test from the first-stage 2SLS regression. 9
Column (1) of Table 2 reports base-case estimates. The estimated coefficient on the
change in log disposable income is highly statistically significant, which is consistent with the
existing consumption-smoothing literature’s common rejection of the complete consumption
insurance hypothesis. The base case estimate of β̂ indicates that absent an offset from income
taxation a 10 percent decrease in gross family income would make total consumption fall by
about 7.8 percent. When evaluated at the overall sample means, the post-tax effect of a 10
percent reduction in gross income is a 6.6 percent reduction in consumption (0.775×(1−0.316) ×
(42,240/34,040)). On average, the progressive federal income tax in the 1980s stabilized
consumption losses by about 15 percent, which is an under-appreciated benefit to households
who experience idiosyncratic income losses.10
Our base-case estimate of the impact of disposable income changes on total consumption
changes of 0.78 is quite similar to the instrumental-variables estimate of 0.80 found in Attanasio
and Davis’s (1996) test of complete insurance in which they regressed the husband’s wage on
non-durable consumption from the CEX, and is also in line with Parker’s (1999) estimate of the
impact of predictable changes in Social Security taxes on non-durable consumption in the CEX
of 0.6. As another check on our base-case estimate we consider three alternative measures of per
capita consumption in Table 2: total consumption defined as income net of changes in net nonhousing non-business wealth predicted by liquid assets, total consumption defined as income net
of changes in net worth predicted by liquid assets and home equity, and food consumption. The
estimated coefficients on disposable income move in the expected directions. By netting out a
narrower definition of saving in column (2) we expect consumption to more closely track
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income, and the estimate of 0.92 is consistent with our prior.11 Likewise, by netting out a broader
definition of saving we expect a weaker link between consumption changes and income changes,
which is confirmed by the point estimate of 0.68. Lastly, we expect the link between income
changes and food consumption changes to be weaker still because food, once accounting for
household scale economies, is likely to be a relatively fixed share of the budget. Food is also
stabilized by the Food Stamp Program. Indeed, in food consumption regressions that do not
control for children and age of youngest child, the coefficient of income change is about 0.27;
once we control for household economies the estimate falls to 0.09 and is not statistically
different from zero. Parker (1999) likewise finds the impact of Social Security tax changes on
food consumption to be insignificant (0.133 with a standard error of 0.2).
Automatic Stabilization After ERTA and TRA86
To gauge how the automatic stabilizing component of the income tax has changed
because of ERTA and TRA86 we make some calculations of the effect of gross-income changes
on consumption changes that can be attributed to income tax offsets, i.e., βˆ (1 − τht )( yht / yhdt ) . In
particular, using the benchmark no-tax impact of 0.775 from column (2) of Table 2 we infer at
different points in the income distribution the percent reduction in total consumption per capita
in response to gross-income cuts of 10 and 30 percent for each of the tax regimes in effect during
the 1980s. We also evaluate the additional contribution to the automatic stabilization of
consumption due to FICA and the EITC.
Our reference households are a married couple filing jointly with two children and a
female head of household with two children. To compare households situated similarly in the
income distribution we consider married and female-headed households with the median, 50
percent of the median, and 150 percent of the median United States gross incomes based on
income distribution estimates from the Current Population Survey. We also examine a typical
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married couple located in the top 5 percent of the income distribution to gauge how the tax
system has stabilized consumption of the wealthy.
Income Taxes in Isolation.

Because the income distribution is likely an endogenous

function of the tax system, it is most informative to calculate consumption stabilization based on
constant dollars rather than current dollars (Kasten et al. 1994). Table 3 presents our calculations
for a 10 or 30 percent cut in gross income evaluated at constant 1985 dollars. The general pattern
is an increase in the effect of gross-income changes on consumption changes, and thus a
substantial decline in automatic stabilization of consumption associated with the 1980s tax
reforms. For a married couple with the median income in 1980, a 10 percent cut in gross incomes
led to a 6.6 percent cut in consumption, or a reduction of 15 percent from our no-tax case of
about 7.75 percent. As of 1987 a 10 percent gross-income loss results in a 7.3 percent reduction
in consumption, which is a reduction in stabilization of 60 percent from 1980.12 Although
married couples at 50 percent of the median had little change in stabilization between the 1980
and 1987 federal income tax regimes, married couples at 150 percent of the median and in the
top 5 percent of the income distribution experienced reductions in stabilization of 35 and 28
percent. A similar pattern of larger post-tax impacts of income changes on consumption changes
(less stabilization) is also evident for 30 percent income cuts.
For female-headed households at half the median income for their group, the tax system
provides no consumption-smoothing benefits for income losses because they are outside the
federal income tax system altogether. Alternatively, median income female-headed households
experiencing 30 percent declines in income faced a 100 percent decline in consumption
stabilization from 1980 to 1987. In 1980 a 30 percent gross-income cut led to a 20.5 percent cut
in consumption, but by 1987 the same taxable income cut lowered their marginal tax rate from
14 percent to zero producing in turn a 23.25 percent consumption loss. Although low-income
single mothers have access to the transfer system for consumption stabilization, reductions in
19

both the generosity of real transfer payments and in access to programs after passage of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 makes consumption
stabilization less in evidence.
FICA and the EITC.

The bolded figures in Table 3 expand the definition of tax

liability to include FICA taxes and the EITC. There are a few noticeable changes. For married
couples at one-half the median income the impact of gross income losses on total consumption
per capita falls by the late 1980s from 6.8 percent to 5.9 percent for 10 percent income cuts, and
from 20.4 percent to 17.6 percent for 30 percent income cuts. EITC expansions as part of
TRA86, coupled with the rising FICA base and rate, enhanced low-income households’ ability to
mitigate drops in consumption. For small income shocks the extent of stabilization for medianincome households was little changed during the 1980s after inclusion of FICA and the EITC.
This implies that a substantial proportion of the 60 percent reduction in stabilization from federal
income tax reform was offset by FICA and the EITC, especially FICA because the EITC was
insufficiently generous to impact median-income households. However, the pattern of reduced
consumption stabilization for high-income married couples is unchanged by recent adjustments
to FICA and the EITC. Importantly, female heads of households at 150 percent of the median,
like low-income married households, experienced a reduced effect of income on consumption
(greater stabilization) because of EITC and FICA expansions.
Tax Reforms of the 1990s.

How much did the automatic stabilization of

consumption change as a result of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1990 and 1993
and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997? The tax reforms of the 1990s partially reversed the move
toward fewer brackets begun with TRA86 in favor of a rate structure more like 1987’s. Instead
of the four tax brackets in 1988, by 1998 there were five marginal tax rates: 15, 28, 31, 36, and
39.6 percent. Significant expansions of the payroll tax base and rates continued during the 1990s;
by 1998 the applicable base was $68,400 with a rate of 7.65 percent. More significant for low20

income households was the substantial increase in the generosity of the EITC. From 1987 to
1998 the phase-in rate increased from 14 to 40 percent, the maximum tax credit increased from
$851 to $3,756, and the phase-out rate increased from 10 to 21 percent. The greater number of
tax rates, the broader payroll tax base, and the higher EITC subsidy and phase-out rates should
make automatic stabilization greater at the end of the 1990s than at the end of the 1980s.
To examine the possibility of increased stabilization of consumption by changes in
income-related taxes during the 1990s we conduct an exercise analogous to the calculations in
Table 3 by using our estimated consumption Euler equation with tax system data for 1998. When
factoring in the combined impact of federal income taxes, FICA, and the EITC there are several
instances of greatly increased automatic-consumption stabilization. A 30 percent income loss
reduced consumption for a married couple with the median income by 21.2 percent in 1987; by
1998 the corresponding consumption loss was 14.01 percent, or a nearly four-fold increase in
stabilization. The reason for the substantial increase in consumption insurance is that the median
income married couple now falls into the phase-out range of the EITC and faces a substantially
higher marginal tax rate than ten years earlier. Similarly enlarged consumption stabilization
during the 1990s appears for married couples at 50 percent of the median income and single
mothers at 150 percent of the median income. Relatively high-income married couples also
experienced increased consumption insurance against large income losses during the 1990s
because of the expanded FICA base. Overall, there has been a restoration or expansion of
collective consumption insurance in the federal income-related tax system during the 1990s
driven largely by the increased generosity of the EITC.
Sensitivity Checks
Our final econometric activity is to examine whether our central conclusion that the
progressive federal income tax system provides collective insurance benefits to households
depends on any obvious econometric detail. Table 4 presents the results of six sensitivity checks.
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Aggregate Resources.

Equation (9), which we use to examine the impacts of

income tax reforms on consumption stabilization, is similar econometrically to what researchers
use to test the permanent income hypothesis (Hall and Mishkin 1982; Lusardi 1996; Runkle
1991; Zeldes 1989; Ziliak 1998).13 If we replace aggregate consumption by the after-tax interest
rate, and if the after-tax interest rate captures aggregate business cycle conditions, then a nonzero coefficient on income changes indicates excess sensitivity.
Chamberlain (1984) notes that tests of the permanent-income hypothesis are valid to the
extent that the after-tax interest rate captures aggregate resources. Tests of partial insurance using
equation (9) are likewise valid to the extent that Ct adequately tracks aggregate resources. As a
check on the assumption that aggregate consumption tracks aggregate resources well we replace
average consumption with time dummies in the second column of Table 4. The estimated effect
of disposable income changes is 0.766, which is nearly identical to our base-case estimate of
0.775.
Smooth Tax Function.

Our next robustness check is to replace the tax payments

constructed by the PSID staff that we use in calculating disposable income with tax payments
estimated from a tax function that is approximated by a smooth cubic polynomial in taxable
income. A smooth tax function is an econometrically attractive alternative to the piece-wise
linear approach to estimating tax effects on labor supply because by smoothing the tax kinks one
lessens concerns over measurement error problems if households switch tax brackets when hours
change (MaCurdy et al. 1990; Ziliak and Kniesner 1999). In the smooth income tax approach the
payroll and average state income tax rates still apply, but the federal rate is a continuously
differentiable function. When we use the smooth tax rate function in estimating the Euler
equation for consumption the estimated amount of automatic stabilization is virtually unchanged.
That the estimates based on a smooth tax function are in accord with estimates based on the
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PSID’s tax rates lends further support that the taxes computed by the PSID are comparatively
well measured.
Additional Latent Heterogeneity.

If our correlated random-effects specification

for the discount rate inadequately captures unobserved growth-rate heterogeneity then there may
be additional latent heterogeneity in the Euler equation for consumption growth equation (9). For
completeness we estimate the baseline specification in first-difference form (difference in
consumption differences), which appears in column (4) of Table 4. Allowing for additional
person-specific heterogeneity lowers the estimated marginal effect of disposable income on
consumption by about 11 percent, such that β̂ falls from about 0.775 to about 0.688. Estimating
the baseline correlated random effects model on the restricted first-difference sample of 8,570
person-years yields a disposable income coefficient of 0.66, which suggests the lower coefficient
from first-differencing is not from additional heterogeneity but from changes in the sample. We
infer

that

our

baseline

correlated

random

effects

specification

captures

time-invariant

heterogeneity in the evolution of consumption reasonably well.
Asymmetric Responses.

We do multiple specification checks relaxing the

assumption of a common coefficient on disposable income.14 The first test postulates that
consumption may respond asymmetrically to positive as opposed to negative income shocks. To
test the asymmetric response hypothesis we construct an indicator variable that is one if the
income change is negative and interact it with the income change variable. We also append to
our instrument set the interaction of income and the negative shock indicator at (t−2). Columns
(5) and (6) of Table 4 contain consumption Euler equation estimates that permit an asymmetric
response. Based on the coefficient of the interacted regressor, −0.0168 with a standard error of
0.0473, we find no evidence that consumption responds asymmetrically to positive versus
negative disposable income shocks.
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Permanent/Transitory Income.

The permanent income hypothesis is that

consumption responds to permanent changes in income but not to transitory changes so that the
Euler equation error over time is expected to be zero. The consumption insurance hypothesis
makes no explicit distinction between permanent and transitory income changes, and only
implies that Euler-equation errors are expected to be equal across households and not necessarily
equal to zero. In our context the tax code does not distinguish between permanent and transitory
income shocks - regardless of source the tax code automatically stabilizes income shocks.
To test the neutrality of income changes proposition, we decompose income fluctuations
into permanent and transitory shocks. Following Gottschalk and Moffitt (1995) we estimate a
fixed-effect Mincer equation for income where the human-capital controls include a quadratic in
the head’s age, education of the head, marital status of the head, and industry/occupation of the
head. We then create permanent income as the fitted value of the human-capital income
regression. Transitory income is then the deviation of observed current income from permanent
income. We report the results of the forward-filter estimates of the impact of permanent and
transitory income changes on total consumption per capita in columns (7) and (8) of Table 4.
Although the coefficient on transitory income is less than the coefficient on permanent income,
which is consistent with the permanent-income hypothesis, a Wald test does not reject the null
hypothesis that the two income change coefficients are equal at the 0.37 level.15
Income Heterogeneity.

In all specifications considered we have assumed that the

impact of disposable income on consumption is homogeneous across the income distribution. It
is conceivable that there is reduced access to formal and informal channels of insurance as one
moves down the income distribution. A consequence would be that the consumption of lowincome households may be more responsive to disposable income changes than the consumption
of high-income households.
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In Table 4 we interact the change in disposable income with a four-part spline function
based on average household income. Specifically, we compute average income by calculating the
1
household-specific time mean of income, h
T

Th

∑y

h
dt

, and order average income from lowest to

t =1

highest. We then split the distribution into four parts similar to Table 3 to create four dummy
variables: income is (1) less than or equal to 50 percent of the median income (I1 ), (2) between
50 and 150 percent of the median (I2 ), (3) between 150 percent of the median and the top 5
percent (I3 ), and (4) in the top 5 percent of the distribution (I4 ). We also interact the income
category spline function with the set of excluded instruments, substantially increasing the
number of over-identifying restrictions. The results for a consumption Euler equation that
incorporates income distribution effects appear in the last four columns of Table 4. Although
there is a qualitative difference in the responsiveness of consumption to income changes across
the income distribution, a Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis of equal responsiveness
(p-value = 0.89), which lends further support for our base-case specification in column (2) of
Table 2.
Welfare Costs of Reduced Stabilization
Finally we address the broader issue of the welfare costs of reduced consumption
stabilization due to tax reform. Parameter estimates in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that for the median
household the federal tax reforms of the 1980s reduced automatic stabilization of consumption
by about one half. Adding in expansions in the EITC and the payroll tax the median household
had little change in stabilization, low-income households had an increase in stabilization, and
high-income households had a decrease in stabilization. The heterogeneity of results across the
income distribution suggests that there were welfare gains and losses from the 1980s reforms.
Using both the base-case parameters from Table 2 and the heterogeneous income parameters
from Table 4 we document the net effect of changes on household welfare.
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We calculate the welfare cost of tax reform as the proportional increase in consumption
necessary to leave the household equally well off when moving from a more progressive tax
regime to a less progressive tax regime (from a system offering more consumption insurance to
one offering less consumption insurance). Based on the social welfare function in equation (1),
the isoelastic preferences in equation (5), and the corresponding estimated parameters in Tables 2
or 4 for the consumption equation (9), we solve
H

κ∑ µ

T

h

h =1

∑ (ρˆ ) (1 − σ)θˆ n (cˆ
h t

h h
t t

h
0t

h 1−σ

/ nt )

t =1

H

= ∑µ

T

h

h =1

∑ (ρˆ

h h
h
h 1−σ
) (1 − σ) ˆθt nt (cˆ1t / nt )

h t

(10)

t =1

for κ given estimated pre-reform per capita consumption ( cˆ0ht / nth ) , post-reform per capita
consumption ( cˆ1ht / nth ) , alternative values of risk aversion ( σ ), and household-specific weights
( µ h ).16 For simplicity we assume that only one state is realized at time t, and we assume a
utilitarian social welfare function giving equal weight to each household.17 Equation (9) is in
terms of consumption growth, and we need consumption levels to construct the utility function in
equation (10). We therefore calculate the household-specific consumption intercepts using the
estimated

consumption

parameters

and

time-means

of

the

variables,

)
)
ψ h = ( c h / nh ) − αˆ C −βˆ yˆ dh − d hγˆ − x hϕˆ , and then add back ψ h to obtain predicted per capita
consumption. Predicted consumption per capita varies across the reforms because disposable
income, yˆ dth , changes with tax regimes, ceteris paribus.
To focus on mean-preserving increases in risk, all the reforms we consider are revenue
neutral. Reforms also incorporate FICA and EITC tax payments and credits. The reforms we
evaluate include moving from the 1980 tax structure for all years to (1) an equal-yield annual
lump-sum tax, (2) an equal-yield proportional tax, (3) an equal-yield 1987 tax regime, and (4) an
equal-yield 1987 tax rate but 1980 tax base regime. Because a proportional tax also provides
consumption stabilization the comparison between the 1980 regime and the proportional tax
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reveals the additional stabilization from progressivity. Likewise, distinguishing changes in the
base from the rates in 1987 sheds light on the combined effects of base-broadening and
indexation from TRA86. Lastly, for comparative purposes, we also calculate a fifth reform that
moves the household from the 1987 tax regime to an equal yield annual lump sum tax and a sixth
reform that moves the household from a tax regime that has the 1987 rates but the 1980 tax base
to an equal-yield annual lump-sum tax.
We calculate two broad sets of results in Tables 5 and 6, one based on actual data and the
other based on simulated data. For the actual data we take the 12-year time series of income,
deductions, demographics, and family structure for each household in the sample and construct
disposable income under the various tax regimes. Given disposable income it is possible to
construct predicted consumption per capita, which we then use to solve for κ in equation (10) at
various levels of risk aversion. The simulated data differ from the actual data in the construction
of gross and net income. For each household we computed the 12-year time mean of income and
then constructed current income as a multiplicative shock of permanent (average) income. In
each period the household realizes one state of nature and faces shocks from two sources, a
common macroeconomic shock and an idiosyncratic shock. The macro shock is parameterized to
the growth in actual aggregate income in the sample for each period, and the idiosyncratic shock
is a random normal variable that is distributed with mean one and standard deviation of either 10
or 30 percent. To reduce the noise from any one simulated outcome we report the mean value of
κ across 100 iterations. Table 5 presents estimated welfare costs for alternative tax reforms

based on the estimated consumption parameters in column (2) of Table 2, and Table 6 is based
on the estimated consumption parameters from the last four columns of Table 4. Although the
Wald test could not reject the null of a common income coefficient across the income
distribution, we believe that the qualitative differences are significant enough to warrant separate
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welfare calculations. Because our estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion is near 2
(1/0.42), we focus our discussion primarily on the center column of each table.
In Table 5 the actual data indicate households would have to be compensated about 2.5
percent of baseline per capita consumption to accept a move from the 1980 progressive tax
regime to an economically equivalent annual lump-sum tax. Given total consumption per capita
of $11,500, the implied compensation (welfare loss) is about $288 per capita annually. The
comparable estimate for a risk aversion parameter of 3 is 7.2 percent, or about $828 of baseline
per capita consumption. As anticipated ex ante, households also value the extra consumption
insurance offered by a progressive tax system over a proportional tax system, as they would have
to be compensated by about 1.5 percent of consumption to accept the proportional tax instead of
the 1980 tax regime, with compensation increasing rapidly in risk aversion. Interestingly, in the
actual data there appears to be very little welfare loss from TRA86, either for changes in the rates
and base or changes in the base alone.18 The scant welfare impact of TRA86 based on insurance
considerations appears to be due largely to the offsetting welfare gains and losses brought about
from coincident reforms to FICA and the EITC.19 Although the magnitudes are slightly lower in
the heterogeneous income coefficient case in Table 6 the welfare loss pattern from actual data is
quite similar to the constant income coefficient case displayed in Table 5.
When the idiosyncratic income shock is small (10 percent) in the simulated data the
welfare losses are inconsequential across all the tax reforms. Similar to the case of log utility
( σ = 1 ) with the actual data, the household is behaving like a risk-neutral agent with small
shocks to income. When the shock is sizable, on the order of 30 percent, the welfare losses get
quite large, especially with high degrees of risk aversion. To accept an economically equivalent
annual lump-sum tax versus the 1980 tax regime the household’s baseline consumption would
have to be increased by upwards of 28 percent. An ni teresting result, which is consistent with
Pechman (1985) who found the pre-ERTA tax system (federal + FICA + state) to be nearly
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proportional, is the small (1 percent) welfare loss by moving from the 1980 system for all years
to an equal yield proportional tax. The near equivalency of the 1980 system and a flat tax is
attributable to the fact that in the simulated data there is no distinction between taxable and
nontaxable income; all simulated income data are taken as labor income and subject to FICA
whereas many households have income that is not subject to FICA. Lastly, we find that the cost
of changing the tax system from ERTA to TRA86 is upwards of 6 percent for relatively risk
averse households facing large income risk, but the welfare costs of consumption destabilization
associated with the 1980s tax reforms are much more modest for the typical household.

Conclusion
We specify a model of partial implicit consumption insurance with disposable income as
the focal regressor. Our data are from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for interview years
1980–1991, and our measure of consumption is income net of taxes and liquid saving. The
econometric model treats person-specific discount rates as a correlated random effect. To control
for possible endogenous explanatory variables and serial correlation we use a forward-filter
estimator. The goal of our research is to identify the degree to which the automatic stabilization
of consumption has changed because of ERTA and TRA86.
On average, the progressive income tax system stabilizes consumption by about 15
percent in the face of idiosyncratic shocks to income. In some cases tax reforms of the 1980s
actually increased the automatic stabilization inherent in a progressive income tax, but the typical
outcome is that ERTA and TRA86 reduced total consumption stability by about 50 percent.
More recent tax reforms, most notably expanded FICA coverage and increased EITC generosity,
have restored or enhanced consumption insurance for certain economic groups, single mothers
and low income married couples.
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Our results highlight an under-appreciated benefit to households implicit in a progressive
income tax. Undoubtedly the deadweight loss from reduced incentives declined for many
taxpayers with the 1980s tax reforms. However, our simulations indicate that there was also a
welfare loss from the reduction in collective insurance. An important topic for future research is
to evaluate the offsetting welfare gains and losses from static versus dynamic efficiency effects
of changes in the structure of personal income-based taxes with an eye toward more
comprehensive optimal tax research.
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1.

Our

empirical

{(

model

θ ht = exp σ d thγ + ln vth

)} ,

will
where

parameterize
d th

intertemporal

preferences

as

is a 1×k vector of observed time-varying

demographics and ln vth is a mean-zero random shock.
2.

Also important is the impact of tax reforms on the taxable income base. TRA86 had
several base-broadening measures, which may or may not increase stabilization relative
to the pre-TRA86 system depending on whether newly taxed income components are
relatively volatile. We attempt to isolate changes in the rates versus the base in some of
our welfare simulations below.

3.

Note that when gross income changes there is both a direct effect on per capita
consumption via β and an indirect effect via the tax system,
h

∂T ∂ C   1 
β 1 − h + ht  *  h  .
∂yt   ydt 
 ∂yt
Because equation (7) is in double-log form the partial derivative with respect to gross
income is
∂ ( cth / nth )
h
h
h
∂ ln ( ct / nt ) / ∂yt =
/ ∂yth .
h
h
ct / nt
To keep the formula in terms of an elasticity it is necessary to multiply both sides by
gross income, yth .

4.

A practical reason for our sample dates is that in 1980 the PSID converted from handcalculated income tax information to computer-generated data, reducing measurement
error considerably. In 1992 the PSID ceased collecting tax data, making 1991 the last
year tax information is available.

5.

For an econometric examination of changes in home equity and saving see Engelhardt
(1996).

6.

Our measure of net worth might be understated because of omitted pensions. The lack of
pension wealth data in the PSID should not be problematic for our purposes. During the
1980s over 60 percent of workers are not covered by private pensions (Statistical
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Abstract of the United States 1998). Moreover, the majority of pension plan participants
(over 60 percent in 1980, for example) are in defined benefit plans, which are highly
illiquid because defined benefit pensions rarely offer the opportunity for borrowing
against them for current consumption. Gale (1998) provides a critical survey of empirical
estimates of the impact of pensions on overall saving and finds that after correcting for
common econometric biases pensions may offset other forms of saving upwards of 70
percent. Engen and Gale (2000) examine the impact of 401(k) plans on household wealth.
Except for low-earnings households, 401(k)s seem to offer little net additions to wealth.
7.

The average state tax rate in the marginal tax rate is best viewed as a proportional tax
over and above the federal marginal tax rate and is an additional source of consumption
stabilization.

8.

Following Hayashi et al. (1996), we balance the unbalanced data by setting to zero
incalculable changes in consumption across years resulting from missing person years.
The procedure guarantees positive semi-definiteness of the fourth moments and ensures
that the expectation of the moment condition is zero.

9.

Selected summary statistics for regression variables appear in Appendix Table A.2. We
deflated food consumption by the food component of the CPI and deflated total
consumption and income by the personal consumption expenditure deflator (base 1987).

10.

In addition to the Sargan test, a specification check on the results in column (1) is the
pseudo likelihood ratio test of Eichenbaum et al. (1988), which can be used to examine
the exogeneity of instruments: the household head’s hours of work at time t−1 and the
household’s disposable income at time t−2 in particular. Disposable income at t−2 may
fail exogeneity if there is sluggish adjustment of consumption changes to past income.
Hours of work may fail exogeneity if consumption and leisure are not separable in utility,
although by including gross income we are implicitly allowing non-separability between
consumption and leisure. The data do not reject the null of instrument exogeneity. As a
final check of our base specification’s instrument quality we estimated the first-stage
model of the change in disposable income on our instrument set, which yields a firststage F-test of instrument relevance of 7.03 with a p-value less than 0.0000, indicating
that our instruments are of good quality.

11.

We have also constructed total consumption similarly to that used in column (2) except
that instead of predicted wealth we constructed wealth by capitalizing rent, interest, and
dividend income. The resulting point estimate was 0.91. We also constructed saving by
permitting asset revaluations between years, with the interest rate a weighted average of
equity and bond yields. There was little difference in the point estimates.

12.

In 1980 the household moved from the 28 to the 24 percent marginal tax bracket. In 1987
the household remains in the 15 percent bracket after the income cut.

13.

It is possible to have complete consumption insurance and yet violate the permanent
income hypothesis, or vice versa, however (Cochrane 1991).
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14.

In an additional check not tabulated we consider the Lucas Critique, which suggests that
the impact of disposable income may itself vary with the tax regime. We tested the
possibility of policy induced parameter change by permitting the estimated disposable
income coefficient to differ pre- and post-TRA86. The income coefficient is slightly
more positive (consumption slightly less smooth) but never significantly so post TRA86.

15.

Note that it is possible to estimate the model by OLS if we assume that permanent and
transitory income are correctly measured. OLS yields coefficients of 0.840 (0.068) and
0.783 (0.015) for permanent and transitory income. The Wald test again does not reject
the null of equality at the 0.39 level.

16.

The calculation is similar to how Attanasio and Davis (1996) examine the welfare cost of
complete insurance.

17.

The standard model of consumption insurance postulates that the household weight is a
positive function of the consumption endowment. In results not reported we used
estimated household fixed effects as the weight with little change in the results.

18.

As a check on the insurance implicitly provided by bracket creep we computed welfare
under the 1987 base and rate regime (σ = 2) versus an equal yield annual lump sum tax
leaving the brackets unindexed for inflation. The welfare cost rises from the 1.43 percent
annually in Table 5 to 1.80 percent annually.

19.

The welfare loss is increased by about a third (to 0.27 percent from the 0.21 percent in
Table 5) when we partial out the effect of the changes in the federal income tax rates only
pre-ERTA to post-TRA86.
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Table 1. Tax Rate Schedules for Married Taxpayers
in Selected Tax Years a
Taxable Income
(thousands of
dollars)

Marginal Tax
Rate
(percents)

Taxable Income
(thousands of
dollars)

1980
3.4 or less
3.4–5.5
5.5–7.6
7.6–11.9
11.9–16.0
16.0–20.2
20.2–24.6
24.6–29.9
29.9–35.2
35.2–45.8
45.8–60.0
60.0–85.6
85.6–109.4
109.4–162.4
162.4–215.4
215.4+

Marginal Tax
Rate
(percents)
1982

0
14
16
18
21
24
28
32
37
43
49
54
59
64
68
70

3.4 or less
3.4–5.5
5.5–7.6
7.6–11.9
11.9–16.0
16.0–20.2
20.2–24.6
24.6–29.9
29.9–35.2
35.2–45.8
45.8–60.0
60.0–85.6
85.6–109.4
109.4–162.4
162.4–215.4
215.4+

0
12
14
16
19
22
25
29
33
39
44
49
50
50
50
50

1985
1987
3.54 or less
0
3.0 or less
11
3.54–5.72
11
3.0–28.0
15
5.72–7.91
12
28.0–45.0
28
7.91–12.39
14
45.0–90.0
35
12.39–16.65
16
90.0+
38.5
16.65–21.02
18
21.02–25.6
22
25.6–31.12
25
31.12–36.63
28
36.63–47.67
33
47.67–62.45
38
62.45–89.09
42
89.09–113.86
45
113.86–169.02
49
169.02+
50
a
Taxable income for tax years prior to 1987 is typically defined as adjusted gross income less
exemptions and excess itemized deductions (the excess of itemized deductions over the zero bracket
amount). For 1987 and beyond taxable income is defined as adjusted gross income less exemptions and the
larger of itemized deductions or the standard deduction.

Table 2. Forward-Filter Estimates of the Impact of Disposable Income
on ∆ln (Consumption Per Capita) a

∆ln(Sample Consumption)
∆ln(Disposable Income)
Sargan Testd
.

Base Case b
C0
0.4165
(0.0764)

Alternative Consumption Measures c
C1
C2
C3
0.3502
0.4348
0.4988
(0.0819)
(0.1418)
(0.1496)

0.7752
(0.0963)

0.9253
(0.0909)

0.6773
(0.1423)

0.0869
(0.0768)

33.4146
[35, 0.545]

27.8353
[35, 0.800]

49.3175
[35, 0.055]

42.0248
[35, 0.193]

Number of Observations
10,360
10,894
8,308
9,874
a
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. Each specification
controls for changes in the number of children, changes in the age of the youngest child, and dummy
variables for race, education, and five-year birth cohort. The instrument set includes a constant, (t−1)
values of head’s annual hours of work, age of head, the number of children, the head’s real hourly wage,
state unemployment rate, dummies for marital status, health status, spouse’s education, geographic region,
industry, occupation, union status, female head, and home ownership, along with (t−2) values of real
disposable income.
b
Base total consumption is defined as disposable income less saving, where saving is the first difference
of net worth predicted by liquid assets.
c
Total consumption denoted as C1 is defined as disposable income less saving, where saving is the first
difference of net non-housing non-business wealth predicted by liquid assets. Total consumption denoted
as C2 is defined as disposable income less saving, where saving is the first difference of net worth
predicted by liquid assets and home equity. Total consumption denoted as C3 is defined as food
expenditures at home and away from home.
d
The Sargan Test is for the validity of the over identifying restrictions in the first-stage IV model. The
degrees of freedom and p-values are given in square brackets.

Table 3. Percent Reduction in Total Consumption Per Capita in Response to Gross
Income Cuts of 10 and 30 Percent for Alternative Tax Years and Filing Status
(inclusive of FICA and the Earned Income Tax Credit)a

Year

1980

Married Couple with Two Children
Female Head with Two Children
150
150
50 Percent of
Top 5
50 Percent
Percent of
Percent of
Median
Median
Median
Median
Percent
of Median
Median
10 Percent Cut in Gross Income
(1985 dollars)
6.89
6.62
5.72
5.62
7.75
6.84
6.67
(6.83)
(7.09)
(6.00)
(5.84)
(7.75)
(5.66)
(6.59)

1982

6.93
(6.87)

6.69
(6.61)

5.82
(6.25)

5.87
(6.18)

7.75
(7.75)

7.00
(5.71)

6.79
(6.72)

1985

7.09
(7.03)

6.87
(6.79)

6.28
(6.80)

6.28
(6.65)

7.75
(7.75)

7.14
(5.85)

6.98
(6.92)

1987

6.82
(5.88)

7.26
(7.21)

6.42
(6.97)

6.22
(6.60)

7.75
(7.75)

7.00
(5.71)

6.98
(5.98)

20.46
(16.32)

20.88
(20.70)

1980

20.55
(20.37)

20.22
(19.98)

30 Percent Cut in Gross Income
(1985 dollars)
19.29
17.55
23.25
(18.63)
(18.39)
(23.25)

1982

20.70
(20.52)

20.22
(19.98)

18.36
(17.94)

18.03
(19.23)

23.25
(23.25)

20.97
(16.44)

20.82
(17.28)

1985

21.27
(21.12)

21.09
(20.91)

20.25
(19.98)

19.35
(20.76)

23.25
(23.25)

21.21
(16.65)

21.21
(17.67)

1987

20.85
(17.61)

21.36
(21.21)

21.96
(21.87)

19.68
(21.15)

23.25
(23.25)

23.25
(18.57)

20.37
(16.83)

Based on the estimate of β̂ from column (2), Table 2, the numbers in the table reflect the impact of gross
income changes on total consumption changes after a 10 (30) percent income loss, βˆ (1 − τt )( yt / ydt ) . In the
absence of income taxes the consumption effect is βˆ *(100%) and βˆ *(300%) , or 7.75 percent and 23.25
percent. Each representative filing unit is assumed to take the standard deduction and personal exemptions in
calculating taxable income.
a

Table 4. Sensitivity of the Effect of Disposable Income Changes on
Log Per Capita Total Consumption Changes a

Time Dummies

b

∆ ln (Disposable Income)
0.7663
(0.0985)

Sargan Testb
32.6673
[35, 0.58]

Smoth MTRc

0.8005
(0.0964)

32.5554
[35, 0.59]

First Differenced

0.6884
(0.1499)

20.0116
[35, 0.98]

Assymmetric Responses e
∆ ln( y )

∆ ln( y ) * I ( ∆ ln < 0)
Permanent/Transitory f
P
∆ ln( y )

T
∆ ln( y )
Heterogeneous Responses b
∆ ln( y ) * I ( y < 0.5Med)

∆ ln( y ) * I (0.5 < y < 1.5Med)
∆ ln( y ) * I (0.5 < y < Top5)
∆ ln( y) * I (y ≥ Top 5 )

0.7906
(0.0306)
0.0168
(0.0473)

33.8156
[35, 0.53]

0.8273
(0.1046)
0.7246
(0.0461)

35.4120
[35, 0.45]

0.8124
(0.1689)
0.7030
(0.1079)
0.6080
(0.1709)

108.3599
[136, 0.96]

0.6765
(0.1688)
a
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Base case
estimate is 0.7752 (0.0963).
b
Time dummies are used as covariates in place of the sample average of consumption, NT = 10,360.
c
The marginal tax rate is approximated by smooth, cubic polynomial in taxable income, NT = 10,351.
d
Model in equation (7) is estimated in first differences. NT = 8,570.
e
Model permits differences in income coefficients for positive versus negative changes. NT = 10,360.
f
Model permits differences in income coefficients for permanent versus transitory income changes,
where permanent income is predicted income from a fixed-effect human capital earnings equation and
transitory income is the current period deviation from predicted income. NT = 10,360.
g
Model permits differences in income coefficients for 12-year mean income less than one-half the
median, between one-half and one-and-one-half the median, between one and a half the median and the top
5, and those in the top 5 of the distribution. NT = 10,360.
h
The Sargan Test is for the validity of the overidentifying restrictions in first-stage IV. The degrees of
freedom and p-values are given in square brackets.
See notes to Table 3 for additional details.

Table 5. Welfare Costs of Alternative Tax Regimes—Common Income Coefficient Modela
(in percent)
Actual Data

Simulated Data
Common and 10 Percent
Common and 30 Percent
Idiosyncratic Income Shock
Idiosyncratic Income Shock
Coefficient of Relative Risk
Coefficient of Relative Risk
Aversion to:
Aversion Equal to:
(1)
(2)b
(3)
(1)
(2)b
(3)
0.04
0.14
0.01
0.29
7.10
27.79
0.06
0.05
0.00
0.01
0.94
0.82
0.02
0.18
0.01
0.28
6.43
26.33

Percent Increase in Consumption to
Coefficient of Relative Risk
Compensate for Move
Aversion Equal to:
From:
To:
(1)
(2)b
(3)
1980 Regime
Equal Yield Lump Sum
0.30
2.46
7.19
1980 Regime
Equal Yield Proportional Tax
0.02
1.49
5.89
1980 Equal Yield
Equal Yield Lump Sum
0.28
1.00
0.21
Proportional Tax
1987 Regime
Equal Yield Lump Sum
0.24
1.43
0.30
0.04
1987 Rate Regime
Equal Yield Lump Sum
0.21
1.84
1.20
0.01
1980 Regime
Equal Yield 1987 Regime
0.03
0.21
0.01
0.00
1980 Regime
Equal Yield 1987 Rate Regime
0.05
0.16
0.01
0.02
a
The estimated income coefficients for the consumption function come from column (2) of Table 2.
b
A coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2 is most consistent with the implied estimate from the data.

0.10
0.13
0.01
0.01

0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00

0.23
0.22
0.02
0.03

5.72
5.79
0.82
0.73

21.34
25.89
5.91
8.79

Table 6. Welfare Costs of Alternative Tax Regimes—Heterogeneous Income Coefficient Modela
(in percent)
Actual Data

Simulated Data
Common and 10 Percent
Common and 30 Percent
Idiosyncratic Income Shock
Idiosyncratic Income Shock
Coefficient of Relative Risk
Coefficient of Relative Risk
Aversion to:
Aversion Equal to:
(1)
(2)b
(3)
(1)
(2)b
(3)
0.03
0.10
0.00
0.27
5.67
22.76
0.04
0.05
0.00
0.02
0.76
0.34
0.02
0.15
0.00
0.26
5.11
21.61

Percent Increase in Consumption to
Coefficient of Relative Risk
Compensate for Move
Aversion Equal to:
From:
To:
(1)
(2)b
(3)
1980 Regime
Equal Yield Lump Sum
0.26
1.89
1.53
1980 Regime
Equal Yield Proportional Tax
0.01
1.21
3.16
1980 Equal Yield
Equal Yield Lump Sum
0.25
0.70
0.38
Proportional Tax
1987 Regime
Equal Yield Lump Sum
0.20
1.19
0.19
0.02
1987 Rate Regime
Equal Yield Lump Sum
0.18
1.49
0.60
0.01
1980 Regime
Equal Yield 1987 Regime
0.02
0.17
0.01
0.00
1980 Regime
Equal Yield 1987 Rate Regime
0.04
0.14
0.00
0.02
a
The estimated income coefficients for the consumption function come from columns (9)–(12) of Table 4.
b
Coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2 is most consistent with the implied estimate from the data.

0.07
0.10
0.01
0.01

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.23
0.21
0.02
0.03

4.23
4.50
0.64
0.47

12.80
16.88
3.09
5.12

Figure 1: Statutory Federal Marginal Tax Rates for Married Couples Filing Jointly
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Figure 2: Average Tax Rates for 1980 IRS and PSID Tax Returns by Adjusted Gross Income
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Appendix Table A.1. Fixed Effect Wealth Prediction Equations Based on
1984 and 1989 PSID Wealth Supplements

Liquid Assets

Net Non-Housing
Non-Business Wealth
1.1379
(0.0260)

Net Worth
1.6788
(0.0302)

Home Equity
Adjusted R2
Number of Observations

Net Worth
1.6037
(0.0286
1.4777
(0.1048

0.84772

0.9263

0.9361

2,596

2,596

2,596

Appendix Table A.2.
Variable
∆ln(Base Total Consumption Per Capita)
∆ln(Food Consumption Per Capita)
∆ln(Disposable Income)
Marginal Tax Rate
Gross Income ($10,000s)
Disposable Income ($10,000s)
Number of Children
Age of Youngest Child
White
Less than High School
High School
More than High School
Birth Cohort 1
Birth Cohort 2
Birth Cohort 3
Birth Cohort 4
Birth Cohort 5

Selected Summary Statistics
Sample Mean
0.004
0.007
0.012
0.316
4.224
3.404
1.359
5.365
0.677
0.224
0.369
0.406
0.282
0.273
0.163
0.133
0.149

Standard Deviation
0.380
0.340
0.246
0.099
3.293
2.459
1.259
5.550
0.468
0.417
0.483
0.491
0.450
0.446
0.370
0.339
0.356
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